The Feasibility of Debt-For-Nature Swaps by Dillon, Nina M.
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 16 | Number 1 Article 8
Winter 1991
The Feasibility of Debt-For-Nature Swaps
Nina M. Dillon
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nina M. Dillon, The Feasibility of Debt-For-Nature Swaps, 16 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 127 (1991).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol16/iss1/8
The Feasibility of Debt-For-Nature Swaps
Cover Page Footnote
International Law; Commercial Law; Law
This comments is available in North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation:
http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol16/iss1/8
The Feasibility of Debt-For-Nature Swaps
I. Introduction
Since the early 1980s economists have been warning the West-
ern financial community of the potentially grave threats posed by the
"Third World Debt Crisis."' Nevertheless, Third World debt, espe-
cially that of Latin American countries, has continued to increase at
phenomenal rates. 2 The International Monetary Fund, in its World
Economic Outlook, estimates that the external debt of developing na-
tions will rise by nine percent during 1990-1991.3 Recent reports
estimate that Brazil's foreign debt is nearly $120 billion-approxi-
mately 1.4 percent higher than it was one year previously. 4 The total
debt of the leading Latin American nations is estimated at $390
billion. 5
Tragically, the rate of tropical deforestation in Latin America
has parallelled the region's astronomical borrowing patterns. Every
day, 140,000 acres of tropical forest are cut for timber, burned for
cultivation, or clearcut for cattle grazing.6 Some Latin American
countries, under intense pressure to meet foreign debt obligations,
I Weinert, Swapping Third World Debt, 65 FOREIGN POL'Y 85 (1986).
2 The World Bank estimated total Third World or "LDC" (less developed country)
debt at $142 billion in 1974. THE AMERICANA ANNUAL 291 (1981). By 1980, this figure
had increased to $376 billion. Id. According to a survey recently conducted by the World
Bank, Third World debt has now risen to over $1.3 trillion. THE WORLD ALMANAC 75
(1990).
3 International Finance-Mideast Crisis, Third-World Debt Issues for Bank-Fund Meeting,
1990 Daily Rep. for Executives, Sept. 24, 1990, at A-I. It is estimated that the total
amount of external debt of developing nations will reach $1.35 trillion by the end of 1991.
Id.
4 N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1990, at 48, col. 5. Brazil's debt represents the largest owed
by any Third World country. Id.
5 See THE WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 2, at 75. The breakdown by country is as
follows: Brazil-$120 billion; Mexico-$107 billion; Argentina-$60 billion; Venezuela-
$35 billion; Chile-$21 billion; Peru-$19 billion; Colombia-$17 billion; Ecuador-$1I
billion. Id.
6 THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM, PROTECTING THE WORLD'S
REMAINING TROPICAL HABITATS (1989). If deforestation continues at current rates, almost
all pristine habitat will be obliterated in thirty years. Id. The Nature Conservancy postu-
lates that possibly three-fourths of the millions of plant and animal species that populate
the world are located in a small band of tropical forest close to the equator. Id. Many of
these plant and animal species have yet to be discovered. Id. Although the Nature Con-
servancy's estimate may be high, more conservative estimates are also extremely alarming.
As early as 1981, the Council on Environmental Quality and the State Department esti-
mated that 50% of the world's tropical forest reserves would be depleted by the year 2000.
1 THE GLOBAL 2000 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: ENTERING THE 21ST CENTURY 36 (G. Bar-
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often implement policies that contribute to deforestation.7 The ur-
gency of this situation has spurred environmental groups to devise
innovative ways to curb deforestation. Debt-for-nature swaps are
clever proposals which seek simultaneously to alleviate foreign debt
and deforestation concerns. This Comment will explore the feasibil-
ity of debt-for-nature swaps. First, it will describe what a debt-for-
nature swap is and explain how one works. Second, it will analyze
the recent Revenue Ruling which purports to provide commercial
lenders with an incentive to participate in debt-for-nature swaps.
Third, it will focus on some of the incentives and disincentives that a
debt-for-nature swap provides to the parties involved in the swap.
Finally, it will assess the overall feasibility and effectiveness of debt-
for-nature swaps.
II. The Mechanics of a Swap
A debt-for-nature swap is an agreement whereby a portion of a
debtor nation's foreign debt is retired in exchange for that country's
pledge to institute environmental protection programs. Although
the specific provisions of each debt-for-nature swap are unique and
can be quite complex, there are two basic ways in which a swap may
be structured. In the first and most commonly used method, a pri-
vate conservation organization purchases Third World debt, usually
at a substantial discount, from a private bank.8 The conservation or-
ganization then negotiates with the debtor nation's central bank to
redeem the debt and issue local-currency bonds equivalent to the
total debt. 9 These bonds are issued in the name of a local conserva-
tion organization, which is charged with the responsibility for over-
seeing environmental protection programs in an area designated by
the conservation organization. The conservation program may also
be financed in part by the interest paid on the bonds. °
The debt-for-nature swap engineered by Conservation Interna-
ney ed. 1981). A Boston Globe report projected that deforestation is occurring at a rate of
26 million acres per year. Boston Globe, Oct. 18, 1987, at 24, col. 4.
7 See Copeland, Buying Debt, Saving Nature, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 31, 1987, at 46 ("Count-
less species of plants and animals will die in the greatest extinction since the end of the age
of the dinosaurs.... But biology lectures carry little clout with poor countries desperate
for cash to pay huge foreign debts."). See also Cevallos, Ecuador: Environmental Damage
Blamed on Foreign Debt, Inter Press Service, Nov. 20, 1989 (Mr. Gonzalo Oviedo stated that
Ecuador's mangrove forests were "ravaged when former President Leon Febres Cordero's
government encouraged prawn exports to bring in much-needed foreign exchange to pay
for Ecuador's foreign debt.").
8 See generally Note, Revenue Ruling 87-124: Treasury 's Flawed Interpretation of Debt-For-
Nature Swaps, 43 U. MIAMi L. REV. 721, 723 (1989). The purchaser is able to obtain the
discount because the bank realizes it may be fortunate to recover any of the money it
loaned to the impoverished country. Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. See also Work & Smith, Using Red Ink to Keep Tropical Forests Green, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., Mar. 6, 1989, at 49.
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tional with the Bolivian government provides an illustrative example
of how a swap actually works. In 1987, Conservation International I
initiated the transaction by purchasing $650,000 of Bolivian com-
mercial bank debt for $100,000 from an affiliate of Citibank.' 2 A
written contract was then executed between Conservation Interna-
tional and the Bolivian government. Conservation International
agreed to extinguish the $650,000 debt obligation owed to it by Bo-
livia, provided that Bolivia establish an endowment fund of local cur-
rency equivalent to $250,000 to cover the operating costs of
managing the Beni Biosphere Reserve' 3 in the northeastern region
of Bolivia.' 4 The agreement also designated Conservation Interna-
tional as an official adviser to the Bolivian government in the design,
planning, and establishment of the means of administering the pro-
tected areas.' 5 In addition, the contract specified that the areas cov-
ered by the agreement be granted the highest legal protection status
accorded under Bolivian law.16
A similar transaction between Conservation International and
Costa Rica sheds further light on the financial intricacies involved in
a debt-for-nature swap. Conservation International transferred
$50,000 to Fundacion de Parques Nacionales (FPN), a Costa Rican
conservation organization.' 7 At the time of the transfer, Costa Rican
debt was selling at seventeen cents on the dollar.' 8 Because the
Costa Rican central bank retained a 25% redemption fee, the initial
$50,000 was converted into $215,000 local currency.' 9 The local
currency was then used to purchase monetary stabilization bonds
with a three to five year maturity date.20 The bonds were placed in
an endowment fund earning at least 23% interest.2 ' Interest on the
bonds is to be paid quarterly and will amount to about $50,000 per
year for at least three years.22 Conservation International may start
redeeming the bonds for 25% of their value after four years. The
remaining principal will continue to accrue interest until all the
bonds have been cashed. 23 In a deal orchestrated by the Nature
11 Conservation International is a private, nonprofit organization dedicated to the
protection of the environment.
12 CONSERVATION INT'L, THE DEBT-FOR-NATURE EXCHANGE, A TOOL FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL CONSERVATION 13 (1989).
13 The Beni Biosphere Reserve is a protected area established by an administrative
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Conservancy, Fleet/Norstar Financial Group of New York donated
$250,000 of outstanding debt to Costa Rica. In exchange, Costa
Rica agreed to add 25,000 acres of tropical forest to the Braulio Ca-
rillo National Park.2 4
The second method of structuring a debt-for-nature swap is to
have the private bank negotiate directly with the central bank of the
debtor nation to exchange Third World debt for bonds or currency
of the debtor nation.2 5 The private bank then donates the bonds or
currency to a conservation organization, which uses the funds for en-
vironmental protection programs in the debtor nation. 26
Regardless of what form the swap takes, some of the potential
benefits of these transactions are immediately apparent: the private
bank is able to remove a portion of delinquent debt from its books;2 7
conservation organizations move toward fulfillment of their conser-
vation goals;2 8 and the debtor nation not only is permitted to pay
back part of its debt in local currency, but is also able to ensure the
preservation of some of its natural resources in the process. 29
Although the magnitude of the debt-for-nature swaps has been small
in comparison to the overall Third World debt figures, the dollar
amounts and acreage involved are nevertheless impressive. 30 Thus
far, about $26 million has been used for debt-for-nature swaps. 3'
24 Lenssen, Debt-For-Nature Swaps, WORLD WATCH, Dec. 1988, at 376.
25 See generally Lamp, A Tax Blueprint For LDC Swaps, 39 TAx NOTES 1215 (1988).
26 Id. at 1216. Typically, the U.S. conservation organization donates its gift from the
bank to an affiliated conservation organization in the debtor nation. Id.
27 In addition, the bank might also be eligible for favorable tax treatment. See infra
notes 32-50 and accompanying text.
28 Because the conservation organization usually purchases the foreign debt at a sub-
stantial discount, its actual spending power is increased once the debt is swapped for the
foreign country's local currency. See Lamp, supra note 25, at 1216. For example, if the less
developed country's (hereinafter LDC) debt is selling at a 50% discount, a conservation
organization could spend $100 for $200 face value of LDC debt. Id. The actual exchange
rate at which the foreign government will agree to reacquire the $200 of its debt is then
negotiated. Id. Although this exchange rate is not likely to be at full value (i.e., $200 in
local currency), the conservation organization nevertheless ends up with a material in-
crease in its spending power. For example, if the foreign country, in the hypothetical
above, agreed to a 90% exchange rate, the conservation organization would end up with
$180 in local currency for its initial $100 investment. Id.
29 See generally THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, SWAPPING DEBT FOR NATURE (1989).
3o Recent examples include: redemption of $650,000 in Bolivia in exchange for the
setting aside of 3.7 million acres of tropical forest; retirement of $11 million of Costa
Rican debt in exchange for protection of national parks on the mainland and on the
Galapagos Islands; and the commitment by the World Wildlife Fund to swap $2 million of
the Philippines' external debt in return for conservation training funds. Work & Smith,
supra note 10, at 49. In addition, both Sweden and the Netherlands have participated in
swaps. See CONSERVATION INT'L, supra note 17. Most recently, the Dominican Republic
entered into an agreement to convert up to $80 million into local currency to be used for
conservation programs. Largest Debt-For-Nature Program Announced in Dominican Republic, PR
Newswire, Mar. 2, 1990 (available on Nexis). This agreement will retire 10% of the Do-
minican Republic's debt. Id.
31 Kelash, Development Swaps Said to Top $132 Million, AM. BANKER, May 8, 1990, at 30.
Debt-for-nature swaps fall within the larger category of debt-for-development swaps. This
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III. Tax Consequences
Naturally, conservation organizations would prefer that private
banks donate rather than sell discounted LDC debt; the United
States Treasury Department's liberal interpretation 32 of Revenue
Ruling 87-12433 attempts to encourage banks to do just that. It is
important to note that the Ruling applies only to that debt which a
private bank donates (i.e., as in the second alternative in Part II,
above) .34
Revenue Ruling 87-124 sets out the following situation:
FACTS
X, a United States commercial bank, holds a United States dol-
lar denominated debt (the Obligation) of the central bank (Central
Bank) of foreign country FC. The Obligation evidences a loan of
$100 that X made to the Central Bank. X's adjusted basis in the
Obligation, as determined under section 1011 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1986, is $100. Under the laws of FC, the Obligation
cannot be held by an FC entity....
The local currency of FC is the LC. On July 1, 1987, the free
market exchange was $1 = 10 LCs.
FC has a program (the Program) whereby a holder of United
States dollar denominated debt of FC can negotiate with the Central
Bank to deliver the FC debt to the Central Bank for LCs if the holder
agrees to invest the LCs in... a manner approved in advance by the
government of FC. The Program controls the LCs by... channeling
the LCs to their designated use in FC .... The amount of LCs the
Central Bank will give the holder in exchange for the debt varies
according to how the LCs are used.
In accordance with a prearranged plan pursuant to the Pro-
gram, the following transaction occurred on July 1, 1987:
[X delivered the debt instrument to the Central Bank and] the
Central Bank credited an account of Z, a United States corporation
that is a charitable organization [as defined by the Internal Revenue
Code] with 900 LCs. Under the terms of the Program, Z can use the
900 LCs only in FC for charitable purposes [as defined in the Inter-
nal Revenue Code]....
latter category includes any transaction in which a country's foreign debt is retired in ex-
change for the country's promise to institute domestic development programs.
32 See Letter from C. Eugene Steuerle, Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax
Analysis, to Sen. John H. Chafee, Senate Finance Committee member (Mar. 29, 1988)
(hereinafter Steuerle Letter), reprinted in 39 TAx NOTES 402 (1988).
33 Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205. Revenue Rulings are Treasury Department
opinions. They provide an interpretation of substantive tax law for "the purpose of pro-
moting uniform application of the tax laws for the guidance of taxpayers." See B. BrrKER
& L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1148-49 (5th ed. 1980). Although Revenue Rul-
ings are less authoritative than Treasury Regulations, they are considered persuasive au-
thority by most courts when cited as precedent by taxpayers in substantially similar
circumstances. Id.
34 Where a bank sells a portion of LDC debt to a conservation organization at a dis-
count, the tax consequences for the bank are the same as they would be for any other
transaction in which the bank takes a loss. See Lamp, supra note 25, at 1215. The loss that
a bank recognizes on the exchange is, of course, deductible. Id.
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HOLDING
Under the facts described above, the federal income tax conse-
quences to X ... are as follows:
(1) X recognizes a loss on the exchange of the Obligation for
the 900 LCs to the extent of the excess of its adjusted basis in the
Obligation ($100) over the fair market value of the 900 LCs.
(2) If X and Z otherwise satisfy all the requirements of the code
in relation to charitable contributions, X is entitled to a charitable
contribution deduction equal to the fair market value of the 900 LCs
at the time of the contribution. 35
Revenue Ruling 87-124 thus separates a debt-for-nature swap
into two parts, enabling a commercial bank to claim both a tax de-
ductible loss for the difference between the face value of the loan at
the time it was made and its fair market value at the time of the dona-
tion,3 6 and a deductible charitable donation equal to the fair market
value of the proceeds generated by the swap. 37
On March 29, 1988, Eugene Steuerle, Deputy Assistant Treas-
ury Secretary for Tax Analysis, issued a letter that was promptly
hailed as a liberal clarification of Revenue Ruling 87-124.38 The let-,
ter responded to specific questions posed by Senator John H.
35 Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205. The Ruling also discusses two other fact pat-
terns pertaining to debt-equity swaps, a conceptually similar debt reduction mechanism.
In a debt-equity swap, the "donating" bank receives an interest in a local business ven-
ture-the construction of a high-rise hotel, for example. See Comment, Debt Equity Swaps in
Developing Countries: Toward a Workable System, 9 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 39, 42 (1989).
Debt-equity swaps tend to be controversial because the primary impetus behind their exe-
cution is viewed as foreign financial interest rather than provision of local aid to the debtor
nation. See Mini-Debt-For-Nature Swap to Break the Ice in Dominican Republic, INST'L INVESTOR,
Dec. 11, 1989, at 8. See also Marton, The Debate Over Debt For Equity Swaps, INST'L INVESTOR,
Feb. 1987, at 177 ("In nine out of ten swaps, it is one big rip-off [because] the investment
would have come in anyway, and the central bank is saddled with paying an unnecessary
subsidy to provide the local currency."). The debt-equity fact scenarios in Rev. Rul. 87-
124 are inapposite to debt-for-nature swaps.
36 Thus, in the example above, the bank would have a tax deductible loss of$10. See
Lamp, supra note 25, at 1217.
37 The bank would have a charitable deduction of $90. Id. In order to claim this
charitable deduction, however, the donation and the conservation organization to which
the donation is made must meet the requirements of I.R.C. § 170, which defines a charita-
ble contribution as:
(c) .. . a contribution or gift to or for the use of-
(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation-
(A) created or organized in the United States or in any possession thereof,
or under the law of the United States, any State, the District of Columbia, or any
possession of the United States;
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
literary, or educational purposes ... ;
(C) no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual; and
(D) which is not disqualified.., by reason of attempting to influence legis-
lation and which does not participate in or intervene in (including the publishing or
distributing of statements) any political campaign ....
I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (1988).
38 See Note, supra note 8, at 724 (characterizing Steuerle's letter as evidence of the
Treasury Department's intention to construe Rev. Rul. 87-124 liberally). See also Dionne,
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Chafee.39 Steuerle stated that the issuance of bonds, rather than lo-
cal currency, as used in the facts of Revenue Ruling 87-124, to the
U.S. charity by the central bank of the foreign country would be con-
sistent with the principle underlying Revenue Ruling 87-124,40
Steuerle's favorable opinion with respect to bonds was viewed by en-
vironmental groups as significant to the effectiveness of debt-for-na-
ture swaps.4 1
Steuerle also interpreted the requirement that the donation be
made "to or for the use" of charities created or organized in the
United States42 to mean that: "[a] U.S. charity may work in coopera-
tion with a [foreign entity] . . .without jeopardizing the charitable
deduction, provided that the U.S. charity has such control and dis-
cretion regarding contributions as to ensure that the contributions
will be used to carry out the U.S. charity's charitable functions and
purposes."' 43 Such an interpretation represents a tacit endorsement
of the form of debt-for-nature swaps which use local conservation
organizations in the debtor's own country.44
Revenue Ruling 87-124 addresses charitable contributions gen-
erally. Although the Ruling is clearly applicable to debt-for-nature
swaps, it does not mention them specifically. In October of 1987,
Senator Chafee introduced a bill which was specifically designed to
provide incentives for charitable contributions of debt to conserva-
tion groups. 45 The bill sought to amend the Internal Revenue Code
explicitly to incorporate the tax incentives created by Revenue Rul-
Treasury Agrees to Construe Revenue Ruling on Debt-For-Nature Swaps Liberally, 39 TAX NOTES
307 (1988) ("the Treasury interpretation is liberal"). As one commentator put it:
A tax attorney might advise, on a technical level, that the letter has no official
status [like the Revenue Ruling it interprets] and that one relies on it at one's
peril. However, it's a good bet that everyone will accept the letter as authori-
tative, especially since the rationale advanced seems sound.
Lamp, supra note 25, at 1217.
39 Senator Chafee, a Republican from Rhode Island, is a member of the Senate Fi-
nance Committee. Chafee posed three hypothetical fact scenarios and requested
Steuerle's advice about whether Rev. Rul. 87-124 would be applicable to them. See
Steuerle Letter, supra note 32, 39 TAx NOTES at 402.
40 Id. The stated principle underlying the Ruling is that "when there are two paths
available to the charitable donor, the tax consequences turn on which path he chooses; so
long as there is substance to what he does, there is no requirement that he choose the
more expensive way." Id. (citing Palmer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 684, 693 (1974)).
41 Barbara J. Bramble, Director of the National Wildlife Federation, remarked in one
instance that "interest paid on the bonds [issued pursuant to a debt-for-nature swap] has
doubled the Ecuadorian park service budget in the past six months." See Dionne, supra
note 38, at 309.
42 See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(A) (1988).
43 See Steuerle Letter, supra note 32, 39 TAx NOTES at 402 (citing Rev. Rul. 75-65,
1975-1 C.B. 79; Rev. Rul. 66-79, 1966-1 C.B. 48; Rev. Rul. 63-25, 1963-2 C.B. 101).
44 Such provisions in swaps may be more attractive politically because vesting control
of the conservation effort in the hands of a local charity helps dispel the impression that
debt-for-nature swaps are yet another example of industrialized nations seeking to manip-
ulate a debtor nation's internal affairs.
45 S. 1781, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. 14,063-66 (1987).
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ing 87-124.46 Although the bill was never passed,47 it is nonetheless
significant because members of Congress thereby acknowledged that
debt-for-nature swaps are "an imaginative way to help developing
nations implement and maintain conservation programs [and are] an
example of taking a very bad situation [the Third World Debt Crisis]
and salvaging a little good out of it. ' ' a8 This acknowledgment may
provide the key to enactment of future legislation designed to make
debt-for-nature swaps more attractive to commercial banks in the fu-
ture.49 As the tax law currently stands, however, there are several
ambiguities which are impeding the banks' willingness to engage in
more swaps. The primary tax law obstacle concerns the valuation of
both the deductible loss and the donation. 50
Finally, despite Revenue Ruling 87-124 and Mr. Steuerle's
favorable interpretation of the Ruling, the tax consequences for a
bank that enters into a debt-for-nature swap remain speculative. 5'
Because each swap is unique, there is a belief that most swaps would
be subject to a case-by-case determination by the Internal Revenue
Service. 52 Although any bank contemplating a swap could obtain a
private letter ruling 53 prior to finalizing the transaction, "prospective
46 See Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205.
47 Steuerle's clarification letter apparently made the need for the legislation superflu-
ous. See Dionne, supra note 38, at 310 (Executive Vice President and General Counsel for
the World Wildlife Fund stating that "the [Steuerle] letter makes it possible for us to rely
on the ruling arranging debt-for-nature swaps with bank-donated debt without the need
for specific legislation").
48 133 CONG. REC. at 14,064.
49 But see Louden, Tax Breaks For Third World Become Subject of Scrutiny, 44 TAX NOTES 17
(1989) ("Still reeling from the savings and loan debacle, legislators are beginning to ...
focus . . . their attention on how tax breaks affect the treatment of loans made to less
developed countries."). Even absent legislation, however, the ability of conservation orga-
nizations to devise ways to exploit Internal Revenue Code provisions to their advantage
should not be underestimated. See Conservation Groups Use Innovative Financial Strategy to
Benefit Caribbean Environment, Business Wire, Dec. 27, 1989. Recently, the Nature Conser-
vancy used I.R.C. § 936 (implemented to promote corporate investment in Puerto Rico
and other U.S. territories) to generate funds for conservation. The Nature Conservancy
and the Puerto Rican Conservation Trust, a local conservation organization authorized to
receive the investments of § 936 companies, plan to use the income derived from their
joint venture to engineer several debt-for-nature swaps. Id.
50 See CONSERVATION INT'L, supra note 12, at 25.
[O]verly optimistic readings of Rev. Rul. 87-124 initially led some nonprofit
organizations to believe that the combined value of the bad loan loss deduc-
tion and charitable contribution deduction available to a donor could exceed
the donor's adjusted basis in the donated debt even where the debt had de-
preciated in value, [but] tax experts . . . since have cautioned that such a
windfall probably would be disallowed by the I.R.S.
Id.
51 See Lamp, supra note 25, at 1220 (noting that "[although] the U.S. Treasury has
done much to make debt for charity swaps possible without violating traditional tax rules,
[t]he remaining tax uncertainties may deter some donations of LDC debt for charity
swaps").
52 See Dionne, supra note 38, at 310.
53 A private letter ruling is an I.R.S. opinion which interprets the tax law based on a
specific set of facts. Private letter rulings have no precedential value and may be relied
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bank-donors are reluctant to incur the time and expense involved in
obtaining [such a] ruling simply to give away a portion of their
assets."54
IV. Practical Considerations
Quite apart from the tax considerations, the decision to enter
into a swap may also be affected by powerful practical and political
considerations. As previously stated, there are three primary parties
to a debt-for-nature swap: the commercial bank, the debtor nation,
and the conservation organization. Factors which influence the deci-
sions of each of these organizations shall be discussed in turn.
A. The Bank
Banks derive one obvious benefit from participation in debt-for-
nature swaps: removal of excessive and unproductive foreign debt
from their balance sheets. In addition to the accounting benefits,
banks also receive at least a token return on their LDC loans. Be-
cause the loss is taken for a good cause, disgruntled shareholders
may be mollified in the process. 55 The potential benefit with regard
to the shareholders might in reality, however, prove to be a double-
edged sword. If the loss taken by the bank is large enough to dimin-
ish shareholder dividends, it is quite possible that shareholder mag-
nanimity would give way, especially by those who do not recognize
the importance of environmental preservation in the Third World.
Banks have, in fact, steadfastly refused to donate debt outright
to conservation organizations. 56 Perhaps they fear that donating
large amounts of one country's debt will jeopardize collection of
their other outstanding loans. 57 The banks nevertheless continue to
play an important role in debt-for-nature swaps because their will-
ingness to sell the debt at deep discounts is one of the factors that
makes debt-for-nature swaps so attractive to conservation organiza-
tions. 58 One problem with which conservation groups may have to
upon only by the taxpayer to whom the letter is issued. These rulings are very important
in large transactions and a favorable ruling is often a condition precedent to the consum-
mation of a business transaction. See B. BITrKER & L. STONE, supra note 33, at 1149.
54 See Dionne, supra note 38, at 308.
55 Snow, Nature-For-Debt Swaps Make Conservation Hit Parade, WorldPaper, Aug. 1988,
at 15.
56 Id. at 309 (BarbaraJ. Bramble, Director of the National Wildlife Federation, stated
it has had "no luck" in obtaining LDC donations, and expectations are that if debt ever
were donated, it would be by "the smaller banks .... either for goodwill or as part of their
exit strategy.").
57 See Lenssen, Debt-For-Nature Swaps, WORLD WATCH, Dec. 1988, at 376.
58 See Lamp, supra note 25. Ironically, "the sudden interest of well-endowed conser-
vation groups [in debt-for-nature swaps] has some New York banks reconsidering the size
of the discounts they'll offer." See Snow, supra note 55, at 15. The Nature Conservancy
listed its total support and revenue at $168,554,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1989. 1989 Financial Summary, NATURE CONSERVANCY MAGAZINE, Nov. 1989, at 27.
1991]
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contend is the growing temptation for banks actually to cancel some
of their foreign debt.59 This would diminish the leverage on which
conservation groups depend. 60
B. Debtor Nations
Like banks, debtor nations receive obvious benefits from partici-
pation in debt-for-nature swaps: reduction of their foreign debt obli-
gation and improved conservation programs. Nonetheless, while the
commodity that the foreign nations give up in exchange seems be-
nign, debt-for-nature swaps have proven to raise serious political
questions for the debtor nations involved. "No developing country,
facing pressing social needs in schools, housing, health care, and so
forth, can afford to commit major proportions of its currency solely
to conservation. ' 6 1 Brazilian Interior Minister Joao Alves recently
echoed these very sentiments: "We understand the Amazon's eco-
logical value, but we have to create 1.7 million new jobs each year
and [we therefore] must tap its resources." 62 Furthermore, debt-for-
nature swaps not only place a valuable resource off limits to a devel-
oping country, but they do so in return for a reduction in foreign
debt that is negligible, at best.63 Debtor nations who sacrifice their
pristine land will continue to face enormous foreign debt payments,
and, more significantly, they will have placed a potentially lucrative
resource off limits.
Aside from the economic concerns that debt-for-nature swaps
create for debtor nations, 64 there is a good deal of justifiable resent-
ment in the Third World towards the industrialized world: "The big
aggressors on the world environment are the industrial nations,
which have given us acid rain, most of the greenhouse effect and de-
pletion of the ozone layer."'65 The imposition of environmental pro-
tection programs, however well-intentioned, could be considered by
59 See Snow, supra note 55, at 15. The Bank of Boston recently wrote off 50% of its
Latin American debt. Id.
60 See supra note 28.
61 Kidder, Debt-For-Nature Swap: A Good Pickle, Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 2,
1989, at 12. The author noted further that "Costa Rica, having swapped down its debt by
five percent, may already have reached the debt-for-nature limit." Id.
62 Work & Smith, supra note 10, at 49.
63 See Kidder, supra note 61, at 12.
64 Opponents of debt-for-nature swaps originally predicted that the flood of local
currency generated by the swaps would produce a harmful inflationary impact. This con-
cern, however, has by and large "receded" as an issue. See 12 U.N. DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFOR-
MATION, DEVELOPMENT FORUM.
65 Id. See also Snow, supra note 55, at 15 (A Third World ambassador stated at Wash-
ington briefing that "we're not going to just save [the tropical forests] for your rich
folks."); Sirohi, Environment: Industrialized North Asked To Do More, Inter Press Service, Nov.
7, 1989 (A Brazilian official noted that "developing countries have also a keen interest that
the industrialized countries themselves, whose behavior is the main threat to [the] world
environment, quickly adopt very strong and decisive actions aiming at a curbing of their
present excessive levels of consumption of energy.").
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many as meddlesome, or, worse yet, imperialistic. 66
Even if the government of the debtor nation agrees to a swap,
there exists a further complication involving the rights of indigenous
citizens. Debt-for-nature swaps are increasingly causing agitation
among embittered Amazon Indians who believe the primary focus
should be on returning control of the land to them. 67 "If you look at
half a dozen of these swaps you see significant problems .... There
has always been a lack of consultation with grass-roots people, espe-
cially indigenous groups."' 68 Environmentalists agree that greater
involvement by indigenous land groups is a good idea from an envi-
ronmental standpoint: "[I]nstead of having [fifteen] park rangers
controlling a huge area, you'd have thousands of tribal people pa-
trolling it."'69 Thus, future swaps ideally should incorporate the in-
terests of indigenous land groups into the agreement.
C. Conservation Organizations
Although it would seem that conservation organizations have
nothing to lose and everything to gain in a debt-for-nature swap, the
fact that each swap is a highly complex and time consuming transac-
tion necessarily draws heavily on the conservation organizations' lim-
ited resources. 70  Most conservation organizations engage in
numerous and diverse projects. 7' To the extent that debt-for-nature
swaps monopolize these resources, the organizations' other projects
must necessarily suffer.
Conservation organizations must also contend with a threat
which could potentially nullify the entire transaction; that is, "the
[debtor nation] still may exercise its power of eminent domain over
its own resources by nationalizing the enterprise."'72 It would not be
hard to envision a scenario in which the intense pressure of domestic
economic strife would tempt a debtor nation's government to exploit
66 Nevertheless, in a recent worldwide survey conducted by WorldPaper, 66% of the
respondents disagreed with the statement that debt-for-nature swaps are a form of "eco-
colonialism." Bicycles, Yes-Cheap Shoes, No, WorldPaper, Sept. 1990, at 8.
67 See Dumanoski, Amazon Lobbyists Come to United States, Boston Globe, Oct. 22, 1989,
at 24. A spokesperson for the Indians stated that environmentalists "concentrate just on
the trees and the butterflies." Id. The Amazon delegation proposed that environmental-
ists adopt a policy of "indigenous stewardship, which would allow [environmental] organi-
zations to help return areas of the Amazonian rain forest to our care and control." Id.
68 See Day, Indians, Environmentalists Meet, Christian Science Monitor, May 21, 1990, at
6 (quoting an anonymous banker).
69 Bowen, Tibes Seek Debt Swaps for Amazon Land Rights, Fin. Times, May 15, 1990, at 7.
70 See Lenssen, supra note 57. For example, Conservation International's Bolivian
swap took two years to complete. CONSERVATION INT'L, supra note 12, at 14.
71 Conservation International, for example, is very active in developing and imple-
menting programs for the protection of marine life. See generally TR6picus, Winter 1990,
at 4-5.
72 See Note, supra note 8, at 735. According to the United Nations General Assembly,
a foreign nation always retains sovereignty over its natural resources. Id. at 736 (citing
G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5344/Add. 1 (1962)).
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land that was subject to swap restrictions. In this regard, the United
Nations has endorsed the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States (CERDS), 7a which specifically lists natural resources as one of
the assets over which a state may freely exercise full sovereignty. 74
Although paragraph two of CERDS provides for compensation in the
event of expropriation, 75 this provision would be of little consolation
to the conservation organization because monetary compensation
can never adequately redress irreparable damage to the environ-
ment. Although the risk of expropriation is potentially insurable, 76
the cost of such insurance is often prohibitive. Despite the threat of
expropriation, the conservation groups do not appear inhibited as
debt-for-nature swaps continue to grow in number.77 The partici-
pating conservation organizations evidently recognize that nationali-
zation is a risk with which they must live if they are to fulfill their
conservation mission.78
Finally, experience from the swaps that have already been imple-
mented demonstrates that protection programs may be undermined
by illegal logging operations. 79 To protect lands covered under a
swap, local conservation organizations have been forced to assemble
staffs equipped with airguns and radio communications networks.8 0
V. Current Legislative and Executive Proposals
OnJune 27, 1990, President Bush submitted the "Enterprise for
the Americas Initiative Act of 1990" to Congress. 8' The Bush plan
73 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9361 (1974).
74 Id. at 52.
75 Id.
76 Institutions such as the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the
World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency sell political risk insurance. See
supra note 10.
77 See Regin, Debt-For-Nature Swaps Seen Growing In Next Few Years, Reuters, Sept. 19,
1989.
78 Although the conservation organizations could conceivably include some sort of
penalty provision in their donation agreements with debtor nations, it is unlikely such a
provision would prove an effective deterrent to nationalization. See CONSERVATION INT'L,
supra note 12, at 28. There is no guarantee to a conservation organization that the debtor
nation would honor such an agreement in the event of nationalization, and it is unlikely
the conservation organization will possess the financial resources to enforce the provision.
Id. Furthermore, the payment of a penalty to the conservation organization would provide
little consolation in the face of deforestation of land which could never be replaced.
79 See, e.g., de Castro, Philippines: Symbolic Choice for Asia's First Debt-Swap Project, Inter
Press Service, Oct. 1, 1990.
80 Id. Even with a well-staffed program, enforcement officers are sometimes con-
fronted by gun-wielding loggers. Id. In one instance, a logger forced his way past the
initial enforcement checkpoint, but later was apprehended by local police who had re-
ceived radio notification from one of the park's staff members. Id.
81 See Bush Sends Legislative Proposal to Congress to Implement Initiative for Latin America, 7
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1444 (Sept. 19, 1990). The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative
was still alive in Congress at press time. See H.R. 964, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG.
REC. H1023 (Feb. 19, 1991).
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calls for the United States to contribute approximately $100 million
over five years to the multilateral Enterprise for the Americas Invest-
ment Fund for the purpose of boosting the Latin American Econ-
omy.8 2 Contributions to the Fund will be sought from other
countries, as well. 83 The initiative also involves the establishment of
an "Enterprise for the Americas Facility."'8 4 The facility, operated by
the Treasury Department, would administer debt reduction pro-
grams for countries that satisfy certain criteria. 85 According to the
terms of the initiative, the United States will sell, on a case-by-case
basis, a portion of a qualifying nation's outstanding debt in order to
facilitate debt-for-nature and other debt-for-development swaps. 86
Legislation has recently been introduced in the United States
Congress which seeks authorization for the United States to begin
entering into debt-for-nature swaps. According to House Report
5088, the "Western Hemisphere Debt for Nature Conservation Act"
would waive a portion of a nation's debt obligation provided that
nation institutes environmental protection programs."' 8 7 The bill
provides specific guidelines for the exchange of local currency and
the management of trust funds established in furtherance of the con-
servation programs. 88
VI. Conclusion
The underlying concept of a debt-for-nature swap is appealing.
These swaps illustrate that the preservation of an endangered natu-
ral resource that is vital to all nations can be attained in a manner
that causes little pain to the commercial banks who, absent such an
exchange, stand a real possibility of being denied any payback on
their outstanding loans. Nevertheless, a close look at debt-for-na-
ture swaps reveals that the disincentives associated with them appear
sufficiently grave to dissuade any one of the three necessary parties
from consummating a swap. Before labeling debt-for-nature swaps
"feasible" or "infeasible," however, it is necessary to focus realisti-
cally on exactly what it is we wish them to accomplish. Will debt-for-
nature swaps reduce Third World debt? Undoubtedly, they will not




85 For example, in order to be eligible to participate in the initiative, Latin American
countries which owe a substantial portion of their debt to commercial banks must first
negotiate a financing plan with those banks. In addition, participating countries "must
have in effect International Monetary Fund/World Bank economic reform programs." Id.
86 Id.
87 See H.R. REP. No. 5088, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1990). See also International Fi-
nance-Aulford Says House Bills Not Adequate to Implement Latin America Initiative, Daily Rep. for
Executives, July 19, 1990, at 10.
88 Id.
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Third World debt derived from debt-for-nature swaps would be tri-
fling.89 For the same reason, debt-for-nature swaps will not provide
a miraculous means by which the commercial lending industry can
stave off the onslaught of the "Third World Debt Crisis" that will
inevitably culminate in massive loan defaults. Critics of debt-for-na-
ture swaps contend that these transactions potentially could delay
real solutions to the Third World debt crisis.90 "What's needed is
negotiated, comprehensive settlement-not something that nibbles
away at the problem." 9'
What debt-for-nature swaps do offer is hope in the fight to save
an irreplaceable resource: the natural environment. Legislation
should be passed which provides greater incentives to commercial
banks to participate in debt-for-nature swaps. Not only would such
legislation aid an international conservation effort, it would also pro-
vide a step toward the solution of the Third World debt crisis. Even
in the event that political problems involved in swapping Third
World debt for protection of tropical forests prove insurmountable,
the underlying concept could be applied in different contexts.9 2
NINA M. DILLON
89 See Kidder, supra note 61, at 12.
90 Flint, When Nations Try to Swap Their Way Out of Debt, Boston Globe, Aug. 19, 1990,
at A 14 (quoting Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs).
91 Id.
92 For example, there have been recent suggestions that debt-for-nature swaps might
be used as a way to protect valuable land on which failed savings and loan institutions are
located. See Parrish, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 10, 1989, at D-I, col. 2. Also, Harvard
University has established a fund which converts Ecuadorean national debt into educa-
tional grants for Ecuadorean students. See Harvard and Ecuador in "'hbt-For-Education
Swap, Reuters, July 10, 1990.
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